

THE KOENIGSEGG STORY

88

Christian von Koenigsegg, the financing of an impossible idea, and the creation of Sweden's hypercar manufacturer - the foundation paper for Papers 89 to 102

12.8.1994

Founded by a 22-year-old with no automotive record and no development budget - eight years passed before the first customer car was delivered

6

CC8S cars built in 2002-2003, the entire first production run - each early sale financed the next build in a company living without working capital

~447 km/h

Agera RS two-way average on Nevada Route 160, November 2017 - records functioned as the advertising budget the company never had

~850

Employees by mid-2026, against a handful in a farmhouse - founder-controlled throughout, with institutional capital arriving only late and only as a minority

01 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper opens the Koenigsegg library and it does not read like a model history, because the company cannot be understood model by model. Its subject is how a 22-year-old Swedish entrepreneur - with no established automotive group behind him, no inherited factory and no conventional development budget - created a manufacturer capable of designing engines, transmissions, carbon structures, electric motors and control software in-house. The central thesis is deliberately inverted: Koenigsegg was not founded because Christian von Koenigsegg possessed the resources required to build a supercar. It developed its distinctive engineering philosophy because he did not possess those resources. Low-volume construction, extreme performance, radical vertical integration and very high prices were never merely stylistic choices - they were the only viable route for a company that could not compete through scale.

The financing story is therefore inseparable from the technical story, and this paper treats them as one narrative: layered, incremental funding from founder capital, family money, small investors and customer deposits; a first production run of six cars in which each sale financed the next; a factory fire that created the factory; records used in place of advertising; and institutional capital arriving only in the company's third decade, on the founder's terms and unwound or accepted at his choosing. One governing rule carries everything that follows, here and in the fourteen papers behind it. The Constraint-Creates-Innovation Rule: Koenigsegg's engineering culture was formed by financial constraint - because the company could not compete through scale, it had to create products so technically distinctive, scarce and personally supported that customers would finance their development at extraordinary prices.

Key Finding

The company was never financed with one large cheque. It survived on layers: the founder's trading income, small private investors, reported Swedish development support, his father's savings, years of unpaid founder labour, then customer deposits and the proceeds of each completed car. The first genuinely institutional investment (NEVS, 2019, 20% for ~€150M) was bought back within roughly two years - and the 2024 Chieftain Capital round (€50M) arrived with the family holding increasing, not diluting, its majority.

Eight years separate the foundation (12 August 1994) from the first customer car (CC8S, 2002, shown at Geneva) - and only six CC8S were built. That gestation, and the refusal to sell an unfinished prototype or outsource the car, established the culture in which credibility depends on engineering rather than presentation.

The reader's line: every ownership chapter in Papers 89 to 102 - travelling factory technicians, in-house parts, continuous software, the factory record as the single most important purchase criterion - descends directly from financing decisions described here. Understand this paper and half of Paper 102 is already understood.

02 THE BOY AND THE TRADER

A Norwegian animation, a childhood in a country without a supercar industry - and a trader's education before an engineer's.

Christian Erland Harald von Koenigsegg was born in Stockholm on 2 July 1972, into the von Koenigsegg family whose heraldic shield later became the company emblem. His father, Jesko

von Koenigsegg, was an entrepreneur; the Jesko model was named in his honour decades later, and for good reason, as this paper will show. Christian has repeatedly identified the Norwegian stop-motion film *The Pinchcliffe Grand Prix* (Flåklypa Grand Prix) as a formative influence - a bicycle repairman and inventor builds an extraordinary racing car to challenge an established competitor, and a boy of about five connected that idea with the possibility of building his own. The story is true and it is useful, but this paper declines to turn it into a creation myth: many children want to build supercars. The better question is why this one retained the ambition into adulthood and treated it as a commercial project rather than a fantasy.

Three characteristics appear consistently in accounts of his early life: a strong interest in mechanical objects, a willingness to trade and undertake small commercial ventures, and confidence that a very small team could challenge established manufacturers. He grew up in a country dominated by Volvo and Saab, with Lamborghini posters on the bedroom wall and no indigenous exotic-car industry to join - an absence that mattered, because Koenigsegg did not inherit a Swedish supercar tradition; it had to invent one. Before the car company came trading and import-export activity - public accounts variously describe commodities, frozen food and plastic products, and the exact scale and profitability of each venture are not consistently documented, so this paper does not present the colourful list as audited business history. The defensible conclusion is narrower and more important: Christian accumulated some initial capital and real commercial experience through trading, but nowhere near enough to finance a vehicle-development programme - and he continued trading stocks and commodities through the company's early years to support himself while taking little or no salary. The education those years provided - negotiation, procurement, international transactions, managing cash scarcity, presenting an idea to investors, surviving without predictable income - was arguably as important to what followed as any mechanical talent.

He should not be presented primarily as a formally trained automotive engineer, because his importance lies elsewhere: founder, product architect, systems thinker, salesman, fundraiser and brand custodian. He is best understood as an inventor-entrepreneur who surrounds himself with specialist engineers, not as a lone genius designing every component personally.

03 TWELVE AUGUST 1994 - FINANCING THE IMPOSSIBLE

A 22-year-old with no automotive credentials starts a car company - and the funding arrives in layers, never as one cheque.

Christian founded what became Koenigsegg Automotive on 12 August 1994, aged 22. The company's own history describes the starting conditions plainly: no automotive manufacturing record, limited funding. The ambition was nevertheless not a kit car or a modified production model but a genuine world-class sports car with its own chassis, its own body, extremely low weight, a removable roof, distinctive doors and international homologation potential. By normal standards this was commercially irrational - established manufacturers routinely lose money on low-volume supercars. Christian's answer was not to reduce the ambition but to build a business model in which the product's extremity justified its price.

The early company was funded through a combination that deserves precise language: Christian's own money from trading and earlier ventures; small private investors; public development support (secondary accounts cite roughly US\$200,000 from the Swedish technical development authority - commonly repeated, treated here as a reported grant rather than an established fact); substantial family backing; unpaid founder labour; and extremely restrained expenditure. The decisive early supporter was his father: according to Christian, Jesko von Koenigsegg invested much of the proceeds from the sale of his electrical business and carried the project through years without customer-car revenue - Christian has said the company probably would not have survived without him. The financing conclusion, and the spine of this paper: the company was not founded with one large institutional investment; it survived through layered, incremental financing, and it had to reach each technical milestone before it could raise or earn the money for the next one.

The years 1994 to 2001 were devoted to the CC concept rather than customer cars. Christian's sketches were developed with designer David Crafoord into a resolved form - initially as a 1:5 scale model - that established themes recognisable for decades: wraparound windscreen, short front overhang, compact cabin, removable roof, pronounced rear haunches, dihedral door mechanism. The design's longevity was not accidental; the company could not afford to replace its visual architecture every few years, so it pursued an evolutionary silhouette rather than conventional model-cycle styling. A running prototype appeared publicly at Anderstorp in 1996, demonstrated by racing driver Rickard Rydell, with early development cars using externally sourced powertrains including a documented Audi V8 installation. The prototype's most important function was financial as much as technical: it turned an implausible proposal into something investors, media and potential customers could see and drive. And then the most revealing fact of the whole origin: roughly eight years passed before a customer car was delivered - years in an old farmhouse, the founder living modestly and still trading, while the temptations that kill small supercar ventures (selling an unfinished prototype, converting an existing car, outsourcing the whole vehicle) were resisted. That established the culture in which credibility depends on engineering rather than presentation.

04 ONE CAR FINANCES THE NEXT

The CC8S makes Koenigsegg a manufacturer - and every early sale is both a delivery and a financing event.

The CC8S became Koenigsegg's first road-legal production model, shown at the Geneva show in 2002, with six examples built across 2002-2003. The first sale transformed the financing model: Christian has explained that revenue from the first car helped finance the second, and the sale of the second helped fund the next. This was not conventional working capital - it was sale-funded sequential manufacturing, and its consequences shaped everything: low inventory, long build times, heavy dependence on deposits, limited ability to absorb rework, high exposure if a customer delayed payment, pressure to maintain personal relationships with buyers, and almost no room for a warranty crisis. Each car was simultaneously a product and a financing event.

Two permanent Koenigsegg characteristics were set in this period. First, production numbers that are factory-small and factory-clean - six CC8S - which is why the Koenigsegg papers in this library will argue less about counting conventions than the Aston Martin and Mercedes papers had to. Second, the direct customer relationship: with no dealer network and no marketing department worth the name, the customer dealt with the factory and often with the founder personally - a necessity that later became the brand's most distinctive asset and the subject of Paper 102.

05 THE FIRE AND THE GHOST

22 February 2003: the fire that could have ended the company instead created the factory that defines it.

In February 2003 a fire seriously damaged the company's production facility. The event could easily have ended the business - staff reportedly saved important tooling, vehicles and records before the premises were lost - and instead it became a turning point. Koenigsegg relocated to the former Swedish Air Force F10 wing site near Ängelholm, converting fighter-jet hangars into production space by late 2003. The new home brought larger facilities, an adjacent runway for high-speed shakedown, a stronger industrial identity and room to grow - and the former squadron's ghost emblem was adopted as a tribute, appearing since on cars built at the site. The fire destroyed the previous home but gave Koenigsegg the physical setting that became inseparable from its identity.

Ängelholm was more than a location; it was a philosophy made physical. Design, engineering, carbon production, machining, assembly, powertrain development, final inspection and prototype testing sit close together, and that concentration enabled the company's increasing vertical integration. Large manufacturers outsource because suppliers offer lower cost at scale; Koenigsegg faced the opposite situation - volumes so low and requirements so unusual that established suppliers could be unwilling to participate, prohibitively expensive, too slow, unable to justify tooling or simply uninterested in tiny quantities. The answer, increasingly, was to make the difficult components internally.

06 FROM FORD V8 TO POWERTRAIN COMPANY

Not everything is made in Ängelholm - but the systems that define the cars are, and the reason is economics before pride.

Early production Koenigseggs used an extensively modified version of Ford's modular V8 architecture - rational for a young manufacturer, because it provided a known engine family without requiring an immediate clean-sheet power unit. Over time the company replaced more and more of the original: block, cylinder heads, intake, forced induction, engine management, lubrication, exhaust, rotating components - until, by the CCX era, the engine was described as a Koenigsegg-developed unit designed for global homologation. The broader pattern became the essential Koenigsegg development method: use an available component to begin; identify its

limitations; redesign increasingly large portions; internalise the technology; eventually turn the solution into proprietary intellectual property.

It is tempting to say that everything is made in-house, and it would be inaccurate - no small manufacturer produces every chip, bearing, tyre, fastener, glass panel, raw composite fibre, sensor or braking component, and Koenigsegg uses specialist suppliers for many materials and parts. What distinguishes the company is the number of core performance systems it designs or manufactures internally: carbon monocoques, carbon wheels, engines, intake and exhaust systems, transmissions, electric motors, inverters, control software, active aerodynamics, suspension components, even interior mechanisms. Internalisation buys design freedom, faster iteration, protection of intellectual property, control over low-volume supply and the ability to create components suppliers do not offer. Its price is high fixed costs, dependence on key personnel, limited redundancy, specialised service requirements, difficulty scaling and long lead times when a unique component fails. Both sides of that ledger matter to buyers: the travelling-technician service model that distinguishes Koenigsegg ownership exists partly because conventional dealer infrastructure would be uneconomic for so small a fleet - and partly because nobody else can service what only Ängelholm makes.

07 RECORDS INSTEAD OF ADVERTISING

A record is cheaper than a global campaign - and for twenty years it was the company's entire media strategy.

Koenigsegg could not purchase the advertising exposure of a major manufacturer, and performance records provided the alternative. They were never merely engineering exercises: a single successful record produced global media coverage, credibility, customer interest, pricing power, investor confidence - and proof that a company of a few dozen people could outperform established rivals. Record attempts were, in part, an efficient marketing strategy, and this library treats them as marketing history as much as engineering history. That is not a criticism; it is the business model working.

KOENIGSEGG - THE RECORD LEDGER

CCR, Nardò 2005	387.87 km/h, 28 February 2005 - the production-car top-speed record, taken by a six-year-old company
One:1, 2014	1,360 PS at 1,360 kg - one PS per kilogram, the self-declared first 'megacar'; power-to-weight becomes the public measuring stick
Agera RS, Nevada 2017	Two-way average ~447 km/h (277.87 mph, peak 284.55 mph), closed Nevada highway, 4 November 2017, Niklas Lilja - the record that made the RS the most famous Koenigsegg
Regera, 2019	0-400-0 km/h in 31.49 s - proof that a hypercar without a conventional gearbox accelerates and stops like nothing else
Jesko Absolut, 2024	0-400-0 in 27.83 s, with the record programme aimed at the car's still-unproven top-speed potential

Sadair's Spear, 2025

The track-focused Jesko evolution, 30 cars - built as a record instrument, sold out on announcement

(Record figures are quoted from company documentation and contemporary reporting; individual runs are examined in the relevant model papers, where verification conditions and counterclaims are treated properly.)

08 THE SAAB GAMBLE AND THE NETWORK

2009: the founder tries to buy a company many times his size - and the one-man mythology turns out to be a network.

In 2009 a Koenigsegg-led consortium - Koenigsegg Automotive, Christian von Koenigsegg, the Norwegian industrial designer and entrepreneur Bård Eker, and outside investors - signed an agreement in principle to acquire Saab Automobile from General Motors. The attraction was real: established production facilities, engineering personnel, supplier relationships, global homologation experience, dealer infrastructure and technology-sharing opportunities. So was the danger: mass-production liabilities, enormous working-capital needs, legacy obligations, exposure to a distressed mainstream manufacturer and the risk of overwhelming Koenigsegg's core operation. The acquisition was ultimately abandoned, and the collapse can be read as fortunate: the Saab attempt demonstrated that Christian's ambition extended far beyond boutique supercars, but its failure may have preserved the independence and concentration that allowed Koenigsegg to survive.

The episode also corrects the mythology. Koenigsegg's public story centres on one charismatic founder, but its survival depended on a network. Bård Eker was an important investor and strategic participant, bringing capital plus industrial-design and manufacturing experience - the precise evolution of his ownership position is not publicly transparent, so this paper records his strategic importance rather than percentages. Halldora von Koenigsegg, Christian's wife, joined formally around 2000 and has carried a major operating role across administration, organisation, finance and customer relationships - widely credited with bringing structure to an organisation otherwise driven by the founder's energy. Behind them: Jesko von Koenigsegg's capital, the early engineers and designers, the technicians, the small investors, and the customers willing to fund unfinished programmes. The mythology attracted attention; the network converted it into a company.

09 FROM CAR COMPANY TO TECHNOLOGY COMPANY

By the Regera era the intellectual property is worth more than a year's production - and institutional money finally arrives, on the founder's terms.

The Agera generation carried Koenigsegg from promising boutique to recognised hypercar authority - a mature carbon monocoque, proprietary engine development, its own transmission solutions, sophisticated active aerodynamics, established global collectors and proven record-setting capability. It also changed the financing psychology: earlier investors were backing the possibility that Koenigsegg might survive; later customers and investors were buying

into a sold-out order book, internationally recognised intellectual property and appreciating products. By the Regera period the company was no longer merely a maker of expensive finished cars - Koenigsegg Direct Drive, Freevalve camless actuation, compact high-output electric motors, high-power inverters, the Light Speed Transmission, carbon wheel technology and integrated vehicle-control software were assets with potential value beyond the annual vehicle output, and that possibility priced the next chapter.

In January 2019 National Electric Vehicle Sweden - NEVS, the owner of the former Saab plant - invested approximately €150 million (reported as US\$171 million) for a 20% minority interest in Koenigsegg's parent company, with a joint venture planned alongside in which NEVS would contribute roughly US\$150 million for 65% while Koenigsegg held 35% through technology and intellectual property. It was the most significant institutional financing event in the company's history to that point - and it did not become a linear story of expansion. In September 2021 Koenigsegg bought back NEVS's 65% of the joint-venture company behind Gemera industrialisation, citing strong operational and financial growth, and the 20% minority stake was subsequently also bought back as NEVS itself wound down toward hibernation and liquidation under its troubled parent. The episode ended not in mass expansion but in reconfirmed independence - and it proved, usefully, that an external industrial group had valued a minority of Koenigsegg at a level implying a substantial enterprise valuation.

The expansion continued with the company's own resources and selective partners: the Gripen Atelier was inaugurated in 2023 for Gemera-era production, and the workforce grew to just under 800 by end-2023 and roughly 850 by mid-2026. In September 2024 Chieftain Capital Management invested €50 million as strategic growth capital - the family holding remaining majority owner and simultaneously increasing its own stake, the funds directed at scaling Jesko, CC850 and Gemera production and the next pipeline. That is the modern Koenigsegg funding model in one transaction: minority external capital, founder control retained, expansion rather than survival, no sale to a conglomerate. The safest ownership formulation, and the one this library will use: Koenigsegg remains founder-controlled, with the family holding structure in majority ownership alongside minority institutional investors.

HOW KOENIGSEGG WAS FINANCED - FIVE PHASES

Phase 1 • 1994-2001	Founder and family risk - trading income, small investors, reported public development support, Jesko von Koenigsegg's savings, minimal salaries; no customer-car revenue and survival dependent on family commitment
Phase 2 • 2002-2008	Sequential customer-car financing - deposits and final payments; revenue from one car finances the next; no financial buffer, every warranty event potentially serious
Phase 3 • 2005-2014	Brand and record financing - higher prices, improved margins, sold-out limited runs, records creating global awareness and pricing power
Phase 4 • 2014-2019	Collector-funded technology expansion - One:1, Agera RS and Regera programmes sold before completion; buyers financing multi-year development; allocation access itself becoming valuable
Phase 5 • 2019 onward	Institutional growth capital - NEVS (2019, unwound by buyback), family reinvestment, continuing deposits, Chieftain Capital (2024); expansion of facilities, headcount and parallel model programmes

(The paper resists romanticising the finances: a low-volume hypercar company can hold customer deposits, a sold-out book and appreciating products and still face severe cash-flow pressure. Revenue, profit and cash flow are not interchangeable - survival is evidence of resilience, not of strong accounting profits in every year. Koenigsegg now publishes annual reports as a Swedish public limited company, and current financial statements outrank every secondary estimate, including this paper's.)

10 THE METHOD AND THE CUSTOMER

Question the component, integrate the functions, keep the cup holders - and treat every buyer as a programme partner.

Christian's engineering philosophy organises around five recurring principles, and the later papers will meet all of them in metal. Question the conventional component: does a hybrid require a gearbox at all (Regera); does an engine need camshafts (Freevalve); does a transmission need one clutch per ratio path (Light Speed Transmission); must a carbon wheel have solid spokes (AirCore); must manual and automatic be separate products (CC850). Integrate rather than add: one system performing several functions instead of the traditional accumulation of larger turbos and more gears. Preserve usability: luggage space, removable roofs, cup holders and fuel flexibility, publicly contrasted with manufacturers that treat usability as incompatible with prestige. Performance through efficiency: power-to-weight, drivetrain loss, packaging and response over headline power alone. And evolution rather than replacement: an experimental solution becomes a customer-car feature, improves across generations and may end as licensable technology.

The customer side of the model is just as deliberate. Deposits confirm demand, finance tooling, support supplier commitments and bridge the years before delivery - and they convert customers into de facto programme stakeholders, which obliges the company to manage changing specifications, delays, inflation, regulatory shifts and allocation politics. Extreme customisation serves the same economics: exposed and tinted carbon, bespoke interiors and one-off specification themes carry margins that materially improve very-low-volume production, at the price of complexity, build time and future parts difficulty. And allocation operates as both a commercial and a social system - long-standing clients, collectors who drive and promote the cars, and customers who support successive programmes stand ahead of speculative buyers. A Koenigsegg buyer is not purchasing only a car; the buyer may be entering a continuing relationship in which behaviour influences access to future products. The founding stories - the film, the fire, the ghost squadron, the father's savings - are largely grounded in genuine events, but the commercial reality underneath is this section: storytelling attracted the attention; the engineering and the relationship model converted attention into financing.

11 SYNTHESIS - KOENIGSEGG TODAY

Koenigsegg today is best understood as three related entities in one organisation: a hypercar manufacturer producing highly limited, individually specified vehicles; a technology developer creating powertrains, transmissions, electric systems, carbon structures and software; and a collector ecosystem maintaining allocations, owner events, direct factory relationships and appreciating history. It is no longer the underfunded prototype operation of the 1990s, and it

remains structurally different from any major manufacturer: its strength is concentrated expertise, and its vulnerability is that the same expertise is difficult to replace, expensive to scale and necessary for decades of future service. The founder question belongs in every collector's file rather than in polite silence: the company remains closely identified with Christian's decision-making, communication and product approval, which strengthens authenticity, coherence and allocation demand - and concentrates risk. Can the innovation culture survive him; is the technical knowledge institutionally documented; can customer relationships transition to a broader team; how does long-term service operate over several decades? These are not criticisms - they are the central custody questions of Papers 89 to 102, and this library will keep asking them.

MILESTONE TIMELINE - 1972 TO TODAY

1972	Christian von Koenigsegg born in Stockholm, 2 July; sees The Pinchcliffe Grand Prix at about five and keeps the idea
1994	Founded 12 August, aged 22 - layered financing begins: founder capital, small investors, reported development support, family money
1996	First running CC prototype demonstrated at Anderstorp by Rickard Rydell
2002-2003	CC8S at Geneva - six cars, each sale financing the next; February 2003 fire, relocation to the F10 air base at Ängelholm, ghost emblem adopted
2005-2008	CCR takes the Nardò record (387.87 km/h); CCX brings the in-house engine and global homologation; CCXR adds flex-fuel
2009	Koenigsegg-led consortium attempts to acquire Saab from GM; abandoned - independence preserved
2010-2017	Agera era: One:1 megacar 2014; Regera revealed 2015 with Direct Drive; Agera RS public-road records, November 2017
2019-2021	NEVS invests ~€150M for 20% plus JV plans; Koenigsegg buys back the JV (September 2021), then the stake - family control reconfirmed
2020-2023	Gemera revealed; CC850 revealed 2022 (50 cars, raised to 70); Gripen Atelier inaugurated 2023; workforce approaches 800
2024-2026	30th anniversary; Chieftain invests €50M, family majority increased; Sadair's Spear 2025 (30 cars, sold out); first Gemera delivery June 2026 (HV8 plus Dark Matter e-motor); ~850 employees

(Corporate facts current to July 2026; ownership and employment figures should be refreshed from the latest annual report when this paper is revised. Model-specific figures - production counts, record conditions, prices - are treated authoritatively in Papers 89 to 100, not here.)

THE CONSTRAINT-CREATES-INNOVATION RULE

Koenigsegg's engineering culture was formed by financial constraint: because the company could not compete through scale, it had to create products so technically distinctive, scarce and personally supported that customers would finance their development at extraordinary prices.

Every later paper applies this rule. In-house manufacturing exists because suppliers would not serve the volumes; the travelling-technician service model exists because dealers could not; records replaced advertising because campaigns were unaffordable; the direct customer relationship exists because customers were, literally, the financing. The company's virtues and its fragilities have the same parent.

WHAT THIS PAPER ANCHORS FOR PAPERS 89-102

Production honesty: Koenigsegg's numbers are factory-small and mostly clean - the model papers will state them plainly and mark the few contested counts.

The support question: every checklist will lead with the factory relationship and the factory record, because no independent service path exists for the systems only Ängelholm makes - the full framework arrives in Paper 102.

The founder question: succession, documented knowledge and decades-long service capability are standing custody questions for every model from CC8S to Gemera.

The financing lens: deposits, allocation behaviour and customer-funded development explain why factory standing moves Koenigsegg values as much as mileage ever will.

BOTTOM LINE

A company founded on 12 August 1994 by a 22-year-old trader, financed in layers rather than cheques, that waited eight years for its first customer car, survived a factory fire into an air base, replaced advertising with records, declined to become Saab's owner, turned its constraints into intellectual property - and reached 2026 founder-controlled, roughly 850 strong, with the Jesko, CC850 and Gemera in parallel production. The cars are extreme because moderate cars could not support the cost structure. That sentence is the whole company, and this library's next fourteen papers are its footnotes.

ONE-SENTENCE VERDICT

Koenigsegg is what happens when a founder without resources refuses to build a moderate car - a company engineered by constraint, financed by its own customers, and collectible precisely because the factory that made the cars is still the only place that fully understands them.

SOURCES

Company history and biography: Koenigsegg company history (foundation 12 August 1994; founder born Stockholm, 2 July 1972; The Pinchcliffe Grand Prix influence; David Crafoord 1:5 design model; Anderstorp 1996 demonstration by Rickard Rydell; farmhouse years and founder trading; father Jesko von Koenigsegg's decisive investment from the sale of his electrical business). Early financing: reported ~US\$200,000 Swedish technical development support treated as reported, not established; layered founder/family/investor funding per founder interviews. CC8S: first road-legal production model, Geneva 2002, six cars 2002-2003; sale-funded sequential manufacturing per founder accounts. Fire and relocation: production facility badly damaged 22 February 2003; tooling and records saved; relocation to the former F10 air force wing site, Ängelholm, hangars converted by late 2003; ghost squadron emblem adopted. Records: CCR production-car speed record, Nardò, 28 February 2005, 387.87 km/h; One:1 (2014) 1,360 PS/1,360 kg, six customer cars plus prototype; Agera RS two-way average ~447 km/h (277.87 mph, peak 284.55 mph), Nevada SR160, 4 November 2017, Niklas Lilja; Regera 0-400-0 31.49 s (2019); Jesko Absolut 0-400-0 27.83 s (2024); Sadair's Spear announced 2025, 30 cars. Saab: 2009 Koenigsegg-led consortium (with Bård Eker and outside investors) agreement in principle with GM, later abandoned. Corporate: NEVS investment January 2019, ~€150M (US\$171M) for 20% plus 65/35 joint-venture plans; Koenigsegg buyback of the joint venture September 2021 (company release) and subsequent buyback of the minority stake as NEVS wound down (2023-2024 hibernation and liquidation); Gripen Atelier inaugurated 2023; workforce just under 800 at end-2023, ~850 by mid-2026; Chieftain Capital Management €50M strategic growth investment announced 27 September 2024, family holding remaining majority owner and increasing its stake (company release); first Gemera customer delivery June 2026 (HV8 plus Dark Matter e-motor; the original three-cylinder configuration did not reach production). Companion documents: Papers 89 to 102 for all model-specific figures. This is a company history, not investment advice; private-company ownership detail should always be drawn from the latest filings.